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UNDUE HARDSHIP: TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACr
INTRODUCTION
The recently passed Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' (the
"ADA") announces the ambitious goal of providing equal rights to the
43 million disabled individuals in the United States. The ADA is a
"clear and comprehensive national mandate" to end discrimination
against disabled individuals.2 Title I of the ADA3 prohibits discrimina-
tion by employers on the basis of disability.4 Under Title I, discrimina-
tion includes5 the failure to provide a "reasonable accommodation" 6 for
the disabled individual if such accommodation does not impose an "un-
due hardship"7 on the employer.
1. See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327,
U.S.C.S. 1663 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990).
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination. See infra note 4 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Title I and its provisions, see notes 31-34 and accompanying
text. Title II, entitled "Public Services," mandates that public services be available to the
disabled, provided that an undue financial burden is not demonstrated. See Pub. L. No.
101-336, § 203(c)(2), 104 Stat 327, 341 U.S.C.S. 1677 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990). Title III,
entitled "Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities," requires
that public accommodations be made where they are "readily achievable." See id.
§ 301(5), 104 Stat 327, 357, U.S.C.S. 1693 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990). Title IV, entitled
"Telecommunications Relay Services," requires that telecommunications services be
available unless it would unduly burden the common carriers. See id. § 401(d)(5), 104
Stat. 327, 367, U.S.C.S. 1703 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990).
2. See S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 368 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
2 (Sept. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Senate Report]; H. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 22 (1990) [hereinafter House Report]; 135 Cong. Rec. S10,702 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1989).
3. Title I of the ADA is entitled "Employment." See Pub. L. No. 10 1-336, 104 Stat.
327, U.S.C.S. 1663 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990).
4. Section 102(a) provides as follows: "No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in re-
gard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment." Id. § 102(a).
5. Discrimination also includes acts such as classifying jobs in a manner that ad-
versely affects a disabled individual's opportunities, utilizing discriminatory standards or
methods of administration, denying or excluding equal benefits, and screening out dis-
abled individuals through qualification standards or selection criteria. See id. § 102(b).
6. See id § 102(b)(5). Under Section 101(9) of the ADA, reasonable accommoda-
tion may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usea-
ble by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modi-
fied work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations ....
Id § 101(9)(A),(B), 104 Stat. 327, 331, U.S.C.S. 1667 (Law. Co-op. Aug. 1990).
7. Id. § 102(b)(5). This language was derived from the HEW regulations, 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12, implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 36; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
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The ADA, although the most comprehensive anti-discrimination legis-
lation for the disabled, is not the first attempt to protect the rights of the
handicapped. Indeed, the ADA's reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship language derives from regulations implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").' The Rehabilitation Act sought
to expand vocational rehabilitation services and civil rights protections to
the handicapped9 by affording them equal opportunities in federally
funded programs."0 Unfortunately, the Rehabilitation Act has not had
as substantial an effect on the lives of the handicapped as was hoped."
Although the ADA does not go into effect until July 1992,12 issues of
interpretation must be addressed before the anticipated flood of litigation
over its requirements. 13 The ADA's effectiveness will depend upon how
courts and agencies interpret the statute, particularly the reasonable ac-
commodation and undue hardship language. The ADA's legislative his-
tory states that federal agencies applying the reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship language should do so consistently with interpreta-
tions under the Rehabilitation Act. 14 Interpretations under the Rehabili-
tation Act, however, have been inconsistent. 5 Under the ADA, similar
inconsistencies would deprive businesses of the guidance they need to
plan and implement accommodations. To avoid this problem and to pro-
vide the disabled with meaningful protection of their rights, courts must
devise a clear and consistent method of determining what constitutes un-
due hardship under the ADA. Such judicial action is justified because
8. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 357, § 2, re-
printed in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 409, 410 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 701-794 (1988)). This language was derived from the HEW regulations, 45
C.F.R. § 84 (1988), implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Senate Re-
port, supra note 2, at 30; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
9. The original purpose of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide research, training
and vocational rehabilitation services to prepare the handicapped for employment, inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 355, 357 (1973)
(amended 1978, 1983, 1987).
10. See Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984 (1978) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)); 119 Cong. Rec. 24,571 (1973) (statement of Senator Stafford).
"Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] was enacted to prevent discrimination against all
handicapped individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational
rehabilitation services, in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, trans-
portation, education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs." S. Rep.
No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6373, 6388.
11. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 997
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Employment Discrimination]; Note, Mending the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 701, 729 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Mending]; House
Report, supra note 2, at 47.
12. The ADA will go into effect on July 26, 1992, 24 months after the date of enact-
ment. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 336, U.S.C.S. 1667 (Law. Co-op. Aug.
1990).
13. See infra note 54.
14. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 36; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
15. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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the ADA is not an amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, but rather a
more comprehensive statute that differs both in scope and effect. 6
Part I of this Note explores the differences between the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act by examining each Act's statutory language, legisla-
tive history and policies. Part II discusses the inconsistent interpreta-
tions of undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act, outlining the need
for consistent treatment under the ADA. Part III proposes that under
Title I of the ADA, courts should employ a presumption in favor of pro-
viding accommodations whereby employers are granted only a narrow
exemption upon a showing of undue hardship. Further, courts should
determine undue hardship by examining the effect of the accommodation
on a business' profitability and morale. These terms are quantifiable
measures of hardship and will ensure that cases brought under the ADA
will be resolved consistently. Part IV proposes an example of the type of
regulation that measures the effect on profitability and morale and that
identifies the point at which the hardship an employer sustains becomes
"undue."
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
While the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act share common language
and goals, they differ greatly in scope and effectiveness.' 7 The Rehabili-
tation Act was enacted to provide vocational rehabilitation for the handi-
capped."8  Although the Rehabilitation Act provides for equal
opportunities,' 9 Title V of the Act2° is the only provision that can effect
this goal.2 1 Section 504 of Title V contains a general prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of handicaps,22 but it contains no details or
16. See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
17. Differences in statutory scope and effectiveness may be discerned by comparing
the Acts' language, see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405(1979), histories, see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984), and policy rationale,
see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956).
18. See 119 Cong. Rec. 24,571 (1973).
19. The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, which is stated in section 2, is "to develop
and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportu-
nity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independ-
ent living, for individuals with handicaps in order to maximize their employability,
independence, and integration into the workplace and the community." 29 U.S.C. § 701
(1988) as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1808 (1986). Although equal oppor-
tunity is a stated goal, the language of the Rehabilitation Act does not make explicit its
goal of ending discriminaion, as do typical civil rights provisions. See infra note 30.
20. See Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 390 codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1988)
(Title V entitled "Miscellaneous").
21. Section 501 requires affirmative action programs in federal employment, section
503 requires affirmative action programs by federal contractors receiving more than
$2500, and section 504 prohibits discrimination by federally funded programs. See Pub.
L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 390 codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1988).
22. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States... shall,
solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
definitions.23 Moreover, it is expressly limited to programs and activities
that receive federal financial assistance.24
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act reveals that Title V
was originally an "inconspicuous" part of legislation.25 Staff members
developed it late in the drafting of the Act out of concern that discrimi-
nation by employers would block the vocational rehabilitation of the
handicapped.26 Only in later amendments did Congress reveal its intent
to provide equal employment opportunities.27 The true weight of Section
504 did not emerge until several years after its enactment, when the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") appointed the Of-
fice of Civil Rights to draft implementing regulations for the
Rehabilitation Act.28
The language of the ADA is more definite and far-reaching than that
of the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA was conceived as a new bill of
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activ-
ity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 119, 92
Stat. 2955, 2982, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)). An otherwise qualified
handicapped individual under section 504 is an individual who can perform the essential
functions of his job in spite of his handicap. See Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); see also Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The
Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 881, 889 (1980)(language of section 504 is unclear).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
25. R. Scotch, From Good Will to Civil Rights 1 (1984). As conceived, section 504
was a logical outgrowth of Titles I through IV. See id. at 51-52. Its language paralleled a
provision of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "However, there is little in the
record to suggest what, if anything, members of Congress had in mind when Section 504
was enacted." Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 49, 51.
27. At the time of enacting the Rehabilitation Act, section 504 was not discussed in
any of the hearings held prior to the law's passage, nor was it discussed when the bill was
considered on the floors of the House and Senate. See id. at 53. The language of section
504 did not change in the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act. In Committee
Reports, however, Congress finally expressed its intent that section 504 prevent discrimi-
nation against all handicapped individuals seeking services from federally assisted pro-
grams. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 6373, 6388.
In 1978 and again in 1986, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to include lan-
guage guaranteeing equal opportunities to maximize the handicapped's employability and
independence. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat.
2955, 2984 (1978); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100
Stat. 1807, 1808 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)).
28. At the time of appointing drafters for the regulations, the Social Rehabilitative
Services Administration and the Office of General Council in the HEW shied away from
the drafting responsibility because of their lack of experience with such provisions. See
R. Scotch, supra note 25, at 61-63. The HEW finally appointed the drafting responsibil-
ity to the Office of Civil Rights which is largely responsible for the civil rights policy
behind the regulations. See id. at 60-62. Due to political conflict, the regulations were
not implemented until 1978. See id. at 80; Holmes, The Disabled Find a Voice, and Make
Sure It Is Heard, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
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rights for the disabled29 that establishes a clear and comprehensive na-
tional program to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. 30
Under Title I of the ADA, employers of fifteen or more employees 3I are
deemed to discriminate if they do not provide reasonable accommoda-
tions to enable disabled individuals to perform their jobs. They need not
provide the accommodation if they prove that it would impose undue
hardship, however.32 The ADA defines undue hardship as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense,"33 and enumerates the follow-
ing factors to determine whether an accommodation imposes an undue
hardship: the nature and cost of the accommodation, the size and finan-
cial resources of the facility providing the reasonable accommodation,
the size and financial resources of the covered business, and the type of
operation of the covered entity 3 4
29. See Rasky, How the Disabled Sold Congress on a New Bill of Rights, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1989, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
30. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 329, U.S.C.S. 1665 (Law. Co-
op. Aug. 1990). The purpose of the ADA is
to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities... and to invoke the sweep
of congressional authority, including its power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities.
Id. § 2(b). This language is similar to that of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See S. Rep.
No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2355, 2355 (purpose is "to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent
problem of racial and religious discrimination"). The Rehabilitation Act, on the other
hand, never states that eliminating discrimination is a goal. See supra note 19.
31. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101(5), 104 Stat. 327, 330, U.S.C.S. 1666 (Law. Co-op.
Aug. 1990). Title I of the ADA applies to all employers with 25 or more employees for
the first two years after enactment, and 15 or more employees thereafter. See id.; see also
135 Cong. Rec. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("The ADA
extends civil rights protections for people with disabilities to cover employment in the
private sector ....").
32. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102(b)(5)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 332, U.S.C.S. 1668 (Law.
Co-op. Aug. 1990). The reasonable accommodation and undue hardship language was
derived from the HEW regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1989), implementing section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 36; House Report, supra note
2, at 67.
If the employer can show undue hardship, the employer is not discriminating under the
ADA. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in contrast, conduct found to be
discriminatory may nevertheless be permitted. For example, an employer who has en-
gaged in discrimination, proved under the theory of disparate impact, may be permitted
to continue such action where it is based on "[flactors such as the cost or other burdens
of proposed alternative selection devices." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115, 2127 (1989) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998
(1988)). This is known as the business necessity exception to the general prohibition
against discrimination. Similarly, under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination,
an employer may be permitted to continue discriminatory action based on a bona fide
occupational qualification that is absolutely necessary. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1988);
see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-37 (1977) (requirement that prison
guards be men was a bona fide occupational qualification).
33. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101(10)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 331, U.S.C.S. 1667 (Law. Co-
op. Aug. 1990).
34. See infra note 81.
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II. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
A. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Rehabilitation Act
Under the Rehabilitation Act, a handicapped employee establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination by proving that he is covered by the
Act; that he was denied a job, promotion or raise for which he applied;
that he was qualified except for his handicap; and that a reasonable ac-
commodation would enable him to perform the job."5 Upon establish-
ment of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that
the accommodation would impose undue hardship.36 The employee then
has an opportunity to rebut the employer's showing of undue hardship
by coming forward with evidence that the accommodation is actually
reasonable.3 7 While the courts recognize this basic four-step framework,
they disagree over what constitutes an undue hardship."
Under the implementing regulations of section 504,19 courts are to
consider three factors in determining whether there was undue hard-
ship.' The regulations, however, provide little indication of the degree
of costs that will constitute undue hardship in federally funded programs
or agencies."a The courts thus have the freedom to create "widely vary-
ing pictures" of undue hardship.42
The 1979 Supreme Court decision in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis43 provides the first and most extensive interpretation of discrim-
35. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1981);
Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1427 (D. Conn. 1987); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp.
910, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (quoting Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 309-10).
36. See Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 310.
37. See id.; see also Bey, 540 F. Supp. at 925 (plaintiff bears burden of coming forward
to show that accommodation may in fact be reasonable). The burden of coming forward
with evidence is merely to "produce evidence to satisfy the judge that [plaintiff] has
enough evidence to avoid an unfavorable directed verdict." Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 189
n.124 (1980). In contrast, in the context of employment the burden of persuasion re-
quires the employer to "prove that the only reasonable accommodations for the appli-
cant's handicap impose undue hardship." Id. at 189 n.125.
38. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
39. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1989).
40. See id. at § 84.12(c). The HEW illustrations of various fact patterns show that "a
small day-care center might not be required to expend more than a nominal sum, . . . but
a large school district might be required to make available a teacher's aide to a blind
applicant for a teaching job." 45 C.F.R. Part 84, App. A at 351-52 (1989). Congress has
adopted similar language in the ADA concerning reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship. See supra notes 6-7, 33-34 and accompanying text.
41. The regulations are but an "ambiguous list of unweighted characteristics." John-
son, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination Against Handicapped Workers: Does the
Cure Fit the Disease?, in Disability and the Labor Market 242, 260 (M. Berkowitz & M.
Hill eds. 1986). The regulations do not help the court answer the ultimate question-
"the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications." Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19 (1985).
42. Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 11, at 1002-03.
43. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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ination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' The Davis Court
held that Congress intended to require "evenhanded treatment of quali-
fied handicapped persons," not "affirmative efforts to overcome the disa-
bilities caused by handicaps."4 5 The Court recognized, however, that
"the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal
discrimination" will not always be clear." The Court stated that as long
as "undue financial and administrative burdens" were avoided, insistence
on traditional practices and refusal to employ technology to provide ac-
commodation could constitute illegal discrimination against the handi-
capped.47 Lower courts, however, have not been able to determine with
any uniformity when the Rehabilitation Act mandates accommodation."8
This ambiguity is costly. Employment discrimination cases under the
Rehabilitation Act demonstrate the tension between the cost of accom-
modations and the need to prevent discrimination against the handi-
capped.49 Because the ambiguous guidelines have fostered inconsistent
44. See id at 405.
45. Id at 410.
46. Id. at 412. The Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), clarified to
some degree the affirmative action language in Davis: "[Tihe term 'affirmative action'
referred to those 'changes,' 'adjustments,' or 'modifications' . . . that would constitute
'fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a program. . .,' rather than to those changes
that would be reasonable accommodations." Id. at 300-01 n.20 (citations omitted).
47. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
48. See Note, Mending, supra note 11, at 713, 717.
49. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individ-
ual Abilities, 69-71 (Clearinghouse Pub. 81 1983); see, e.g., Treadwell v. Alexander, 707
F.2d 473, 478 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("doubling up" of workers would impose undue hardship);
Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (D. Conn. 1987) (cost of accommodating indi-
vidual with step stool and assistance would result in lost efficiency causing undue hard-
ship for Postal Service); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (waiver of
five-year work requirement before attaining light duty status would result in extraordi-
nary costs imposed on Postal Service). But see Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d
316, 321 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1981) (court implied that waiver of physical requirements of St.
Louis Police Department would not cause undue hardship especially where handicap
would not prevent applicant from performing tasks of certain departments), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 976 (1982); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(where Department of Public Welfare had a budget of over S300 million, cost was no
defense to providing readers for blind employees), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1188 (1984); Smith v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
(BNA) 986, 990 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (supplying additional supervision, performing blood
test or assigning an epileptic nursing assistant to clerical position would be reasonable
accommodations in Veterans Administration hospital).
Similarly, cases dealing with public transportation illustrate the lack of a consistent
interpretation of the requirement that public transportation be "readily accessible" to
handicapped individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 792(b) (1988); see also U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, supra note 49, at 103 (discussing problems of defining reasonable accommo-
dation). Compare Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (3d Cir.
1987) (city using federal funds for subway stairs must make altered portion readily acces-
sible to handicapped persons), cert denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988) with Rhode Island Hand-
icapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490, 499 (Ist Cir.
1983) (even though transit authority had ample funds to spend over the 3.5% recom-
mended in Department of Transportation regulation, transit authority did not discrimi-
nate by not spending more than that amount) and Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644,
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views of when section 504 mandates an accommodation, courts use un-
due hardship as a label for any accommodation that they have already
decided not to require in a given case.50 Courts have thus developed
idiosyncratic, fact-specific rules without precedential value.51
B. Need for Consistent Treatment Under the ADA
Future interpretations of undue hardship must be consistent for three
reasons. First, the ADA demands it. One of the ADA's major purposes
is to convert the dependent disabled population into contributors to soci-
ety.52 Congress recognizes the "need to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards" to effectuate this goal.53 By uniformly interpret-
ing undue hardship as a narrow exemption, courts can deter employers
from litigating all but the most unfairly burdensome accommodations.
Second, the volume of litigation that the ADA will likely create54 de-
mands the efficiency of a uniform standard that quantifies undue hard-
ship. Third, litigation under the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates the
problems that inconsistent application of the undue hardship standard
causes.5 5 Because these problems must be avoided under the ADA, this
653 (2d Cir. 1982) (accommodations to transit system do not require massive expendi-
tures or fundamental changes and appropriate relief should be fashioned) and American
Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Department of Trans-
portation regulations requiring every new system to be accessible imposed burdensome
modifications and heavy financial hardships).
In contrast, courts have reached a consensus in cases involving education that cost
cannot defeat a handicapped child's right to individualized education programs under the
Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1980) (interpreters for deaf students should be supplied by university), rev'd on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1980)
(school had duty to administer clean intermittent catheterization to student during school
day); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 218 (D.N.H. 1981) (schools had duty to ac-
commodate retarded residents with appropriate auxiliary aids before determining if indi-
vidual would benefit from services). This disparate treatment can be explained by the
special nature of education. Although education is not a fundamental right, see San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), it does play a vital role
in a free society. See id. at 30; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Also, special statutes have been
enacted to ensure an appropriate free public education for the handicapped. See Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988). For a discussion of the
effect of the above Act, see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 49, at 76-78.
50. Note, Employment Discrimination, supra note 11, at 1011 & n.87.
51. Johnson, supra note 41, at 261.
52. See 135 Cong. Rec. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin);
see also 136 Cong. Rec. H2433 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Lukin)
("[T]his bill will help our country use an immense amount of talent, intelligence, and
other human resources which heretofore have been underestimated, underdeveloped, and
underutilized.").
53. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 20; House Report, supra note 2, at 50.
54. See 135 Cong. Rec. S10,741 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
55. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Except for claims involving educa-
tion, undue hardship has never been a definable hurdle under the Rehabilitation Act. See
supra note 49.
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Note takes the unusual step of guiding the courts toward a more consis-
tent approach even before the statute comes into effect.
III. A MORE QUANTIFIABLE AND PREDICTABLE ANALYSIS OF
UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE ADA
Although the ADA seeks to proscribe disability-based employment
discrimination, it does so by adopting language from another statute.
This language, however, does not provide the tools necessary to accom-
plish the ADA's goals.5 6 Although addressing similar discrimination,
the Rehabilitation Act does not present efficient, predictable and consis-
tent guidelines necessary to effectuate the ADA's goals.Y Two changes
to the basic four-step framework can be made to better ensure the elimi-
nation of employment discrimination based on an individual's disability.
First, courts can make the employer's duty to provide reasonable accom-
modation a "strong" standard5" by requiring a presumption in favor of
providing reasonable accommodations.5 9 Second, courts can further
strengthen the undue hardship standard by treating it as a narrow ex-
emption triggered by a showing of a material negative effect on a busi-
ness' profitability and morale. Profitability and morale provide a
quantifiable measure of the determinative factors in the statute60
A. Presumption in Favor of Providing Reasonable Accommodations
Under the ADA, courts will apply the four-step framework used under
the Rehabilitation Act to establish a prima facie case, 6' but they should
make the following change. If the plaintiff establishes the fourth ele-
ment, that an accommodation would enable the disabled person to per-
form the job, the court should presume that the accommodation is
reasonable and does not impose undue hardship. In the face of this pre-
sumption, the employer has the burden of establishing undue hardship by
a preponderance of the evidence. 62 Under a presumption that the accom-
modation is reasonable and does not impose undue hardship, the disabled
individual no longer needs a second chance to come forward with evi-
dence to rebut the employer, as he may under the Rehabilitation Act. 63
56. For instance, cost is a more important issue under the ADA because it deals with
private businesses rather than the government's deep pockets, which were at issue under
the Rehabilitation Act. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of
Rep. DeLay).
57. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
58. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 20; House Report, supra note 2, at 50.
59. See infra text and accompanying notes 62-63.
60. See infra text and accompanying notes 77-98.
61. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. See Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1982). While this is the same
standard used under the Rehabilitation Act, in practice it will work differently because
the presumption that the accommodation is reasonable will make the burden of proof
more difficult to meet. For a discussion of the nature of hardships actually placed on the
employer, see infra notes 106-125 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Because Congress did not explicitly discuss the elements necessary to
establish a cause of action under the ADA, adversaries of this proposal
will likely maintain that Congress intended to adopt the process used
under the Rehabilitation Act. Congress, however, frequently uses the
language of previous legislative acts as the springboard for new legisla-
tion rather than dipping into the unfamiliar waters of completely new
statutory language." Given the fact that the tone of the ADA differs
substantially from that of the Rehabilitation Act,6 5 and that Congress
acknowledges the need for "strong, consistent, enforceable standards" to
achieve the ADA's goals,66 the ADA should not be interpreted accord-
ing to Rehabilitation Act precedent. The proposed presumption will
more readily achieve the ADA's goals: employers will likely be deterred
from discriminating if they are aware of the difficulty of getting a claim
dismissed, so a reduction in discrimination should follow. In addition,
by using a stronger standard, courts will ensure that the disabled are
afforded the civil rights opportunities that the Act grants them.
This need for strong, consistent and enforceable standards arises from
the civil rights benefits that the ADA provides. Title I seeks to provide
two separate benefits: granting the disabled individual an opportunity to
be employed without subjecting him to the whim of the employer, and
granting disabled Americans the opportunities and protections afforded
other minorities for the past 25 years.67 The theory behind these benefits
is that the country in turn receives economic benefits by helping disabled
individuals enter the work force and contribute economically to society,
thus ending their cycle of dependency.6"
64. For example, when the legislature realized the need for section 504 in drafting the
Rehabilitation Act, it took prohibitory discrimination language from Title VI of the Civil
Rights law instead of writing completely new language. See R. Scotch, supra note 25, at
51-52. Although the language has been litigated, the result of such adoptions is that the
differences between the statutes have given rise to new issues. Thus, there is a need for
altering prior interpretations. For instance, racial and sexual discrimination involve
mainly two barriers: intentional discrimination for reasons of social bias and neutral
standards with disparate impact. See Note, supra note 23, at 883. Disabled individuals,
on the other hand, face four distinct discriminatory barriers: intentional discrimination
for reasons of social bias; neutral standards with disparate impact; surmountable impair-
ment barriers; and insurmountable impairment barriers. See Prewitt v. United States
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981). While the former two barriers can
be treated according to Title VI and Title VII employment discrimination decisions, the
latter two barriers "raise issues ... peculiar to handicap discrimination"; thus, the courts
had to develop new jurisprudence for handicap discrimination. See id.
65. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
66. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 20; House Report, supra note 2, at 50.
67. See 135 Cong. Rec. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
68. See National Council on the Handicapped, On the Threshold of Independence 45
(1986); Americans with Disabilities Act 1989: Hearings on S. 933 before the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 196-97 (1989) (statement of Atty.
Gen. Thornburgh). "Employment offers the possibility of dramatically improving an in-
dividual's lifestyle, while at the same time resulting in tremendous financial savings for
the Government." National Council on the Handicapped, On the Threshold of Indepen-
dence 45.
Our government spends over $60 billion dollars annually on disability benefits and
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B. Undue Hardship - Exemption From Reasonable Accommodations
The parameters of undue hardship are laid out in the ADA's statutory
language and congressional history. First, the statute defines undue
hardship as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense." 69 To
determine whether a particular accommodation imposes an undue hard-
ship, courts are to consider four factors: the nature and cost of the ac-
commodation, the size and financial resources of the facility providing
the reasonable accommodation, the size and financial resources of the
covered business, and the type of operation of the covered entity.70 The
weight accorded each factor depends upon the facts of the situation and
"turns on the nature and cost of the accommodation in relation to the
employer's resources and operations."'" The Senate Report further de-
fines undue hardship as "an action that is unduly costly, extensive, sub-
stantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the
program.
7 2
programs. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 17 (quoting President Bush); see also
House Report, supra note 2, at 43 ("discrimination results in dependency on social welfare
programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars each year"); 136 Cong.
Rec. H2431 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) ("cost of excluding the disabled is S300 billion a
year") (statement of Rep. Gunderson). The ADA will undoubtedly save money that is
currently spent, and therefore promises an economic benefit to America. See 135 Cong.
Rec. S10,713-14 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin); see also 136 Cong.
Rec. H2444 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) ("More disabled persons working increases earn-
ings, lessens dependence on the Social Security system, increases spending on consumer
goods, and increases revenues.") (statement of Rep. Kleczka); Americans with Disabili-
ties Act 1989: Hearings on S. 933 before the Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 439 (1989) (statement of Frank Bowe, Hofstra University)
(ADA is "one of the key tools we need to reduce federal and state spending"). One
authority, referring to the cost of the Rehabilitation Act, stated that "funds generated by
eliminating handicap discrimination would return more than 3 dollars for every dollar
spent." U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 49, at 75 (footnote omitted).
69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
70. See infra note 81. When courts applied the 501, 503 and 504 implementing regu-
lations, which laid out the three similar factors, they first determined the result and then
applied the factor most favorable to its already pre-determined conclusion. See, e.g.,
Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1427-29 (D. Conn. 1987) (court found undue hard-
ship by adding effects on operation to costs of several different accommodations sug-
gested); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (court said there
was not undue hardship that was justified by overall personnel budget), aff'd. 732 F.2d
146, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1984); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (court found undue hardship given the eventual cost of making accommodations to
all possible future applicants, rather than deciding whether one accommodation at hand
caused undue hardship).
71. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 36; House Report, supra note 2, at 67. The Senate
Committee Report also adopts the illustrations of obligations given in the Appendix to
the HEW regulations. See supra note 39.
72. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 35; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
These descriptive terms have been used by courts hearing 501 and 504 cases. See, eg.,
Davis, 442 U.S. at 410, 412-13 ("fundamental alteration" in program, "undue financial
and administrative burdens" and "substantial modifications of standards" not required);
Dexler, 660 F. Supp. at 1429 (accommodations in aggregate would "unduly interfere");
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855 (10th Cir.
1982) (modification of existing programs may be required where financial burden would
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While the above definition and factors do give the courts some gui-
dance in interpreting the ADA, the courts nonetheless may engage in the
same fact-specific interpretations that crippled the Rehabilitation Act.73
Thus, the ADA requires the courts to make a second departure from the
Rehabilitation Act analysis to establish a clear and consistent method of
determining undue hardship.74 To do so effectively, and thus provide the
millions of disabled Americans a genuine opportunity to be employed,
courts must quantify75 undue hardship and interpret it as a narrow
exemption.76
Courts can quantify undue hardship in accordance with the four statu-
tory factors and congressional intent by examining an accommodation's
effect on a business' profitability and morale.77 Profitability is defined as
the ability to maximize profits.78 For the purpose of this analysis, morale
can be defined as the ease and predictability surrounding laborers' jobs.7 9
Hence, morale focuses on whether other jobs have been complicated to
such an extent that they have been substantially changed, altered or
disrupted. s
Measuring hardship by the effect on profitability and morale takes into
account all four factors laid out in section 101(10)(B) of the ADA. 8  The
not be "excessive"). However, the courts' use of the terms in these cases did not result
from careful considerations of the four factors. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
73. Indeed, the factors are substantially the same as those in the Rehabilitation Act
regulations, which resulted in inconsistent interpretations. See supra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
74. Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts could not adopt a coherent interpretation of
the language of section 504 because they had no framework to use as a guideline. Thus,
they would have been legislators of the statute. The courts are appointed to interpret the
law, not create or administer the law. See generally D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social
Policy 59, 257 (1977) (discussing general role of courts when making social policy).
75. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
77. Although these terms are not the only possible bases to quantify undue hardship,
they provide a comprehensive means of addressing all of the ADA's considerations.
78. Profits are defined as the difference between the revenue from product sales and
the cost of production. See R. Flanagen, R. Smith & R. Ehrenberg, Labor Economics &
Labor Relations 51 (1984). Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines profit as "the gross
proceeds of a business transaction less the costs of the transaction; i.e. net proceeds. Ex-
cess of revenues over expenses for a transaction; sometimes used synonymously with net
income for the period. Gain realized from business or investment over and above expend-
itures." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see also U.S. v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp.
1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969) ("excess of returns over expenditures").
79. In the employment context, morale refers to an individual's or group's "enthusi-
asm [and] willingness to endure hardship" in accomplishing the functions or tasks at
hand. See Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed. 1983). The predictability sur-
rounding an employee's job is important because, once destroyed, willingness to endure
hardship diminishes and a decrease in overall morale will likely follow. See T. Caplow,
How to Run Any Organization 158 (1976).
80. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 35; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
81. Section 101(10)(B) of Title I states that the factors to be considered when deter-
mining undue hardship include
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; (ii) the
overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of
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first factor, the nature of an accommodation, 2 should be relevant only to
the extent that it has an adverse impact on morale or profitability. 3 This
demonstrates Congress' intent to avoid disrupting non-disabled workers
through accommodations and thus materially and adversely affecting
morale. The cost of the accommodation" will factor into a profitability
analysis as an offset against profits.
The second and third factors, overall financial resources and size of the
business and the facility, include the number of employees and "financial
resources" of both the facility and the business, as well as the "number,
type and location" of the business' facilities.8 5 These terms demonstrate
Congress' intent to consider whether the specific business or facility at
hand given its resources will be able to accommodate without hindering
its ability to operate as a viable, profit-producing employer.8 6 These con-
cerns, therefore, are embraced by the profitability measure.
The fourth factor, type of operation, addresses the composition and
structure of the workforce, particularly the "functions" and "administra-
tive or fiscal relationship" of the workplace.87 This language reflects con-
gressional concern about the extent to which an accommodation will
affect the day-to-day operation of the site and its workers. Any substan-
tial change likely will be reflected by a change in morale. By measuring
the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facil-
ity; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such ac-
commodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial
resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and loca-
tion of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of
such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of
the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101(10)(B), 104 Stat. 327, 331, U.S.C.S. 1667 (Law. Co-op. Aug.
1990).
In both the Senate and House Reports, Congress clearly emphasized that all factors
must be considered in their entirety in each case. For instance, the fact that an employer
is a large corporation cannot negate the other elements of the third factor or the other
factors and impose an obligation to provide accommodations. See Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 36; House Report, supra note 2, at 68. Thus, when interpreting the factors, the
courts must look to how the elements of each factor relate and can affect a business'
operations.
82. See supra note 81, § 101(10)(B)(i).
83. For example, redelegating assignments may affect morale, but raising a desk to fit
a wheelchair will not.
84. See supra note 81, 101(10)(B)(i).
85. See supra note 81, § 101(10)(B)(ii) & (iii).
86. House Representative Hoyer expressed this when he opposed an amendment that
limited undue hardship to a percentage of an employee's salary. He stated that depend-
ing upon the business' resources, significant difficulty or expense to a small business pay-
ing its employees $20,000 may be S400 or $300-a sum much less than 10% of an
employee's salary. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2474 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Hoyer).
87. See supra note 81, § 101(10)(B)(iv).
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profitability, any change that increases the number of workers necessary
to achieve a given output also will be recognized.
One argument against these proposed changes is that the statute only
enumerates the four factors, but does not refer to profitability and mo-
rale. Therefore, if the courts adopt the proposed analysis of undue hard-
ship, they would be legislating rather than interpreting the law. 8  As was
the case with the Rehabilitation Act, however, under the ADA the regu-
lating agency89 and the courts must strike a balance between providing
accommodations and preserving business viability. 90 To do so, courts
must ascertain the intention of Congress in order to allocate the proper
weight to the statutory language. 91 Because the language of the Rehabili-
tation Act provides no legal standards or guidance for interpreting it,
almost any action courts take under the Rehabilitation Act bordered on
legislation.92 Under the ADA, however, the courts should more easily be
able to interpret the language because it is much more definite and has
extensive legislative history.93 Because Title I is in the general corpus of
discrimination law, courts can also look to general civil rights principles
when construing the Act.94 One basic interpretive principle in civil
88. A similar argument was made to reverse a district court holding that proposed a
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether expenditures for an accessible rapid transit
system imposed undue hardship. See Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm'n v.
Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490, 494-99 (1st Cir. 1983). In Rhode Island,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the cost-benefit analysis that the
district court used did not solve the problem of judgments being "mere personal predilec-
tions," because the test did not mention the parameters within which it was to be used.
See id. at 498. Due to the difficulty of ascertaining numbers to assign to the cost-benefit
test, the district court was at best offering an educated guess as to the point at which
undue hardship occurred. See id. The court's inference was that the district court was
legislating, not interpreting the law. See id. at 498-99.
Under the proposed profitability and morale analysis, courts do not attempt to attach a
price to the benefits of the ADA, but rather concentrate solely on the ascertainable price
of the accommodation to the business to determine whether it is an inappropriate price to
impose on the employer.
89. Part IV of this Note proposes a regulation that defines the point at which hard-
ship becomes undue as when negative changes in profitability and morale occur. See
infra notes 126-136 and accompanying text. If the regulating agency were to adopt such
a regulation, the courts would merely be giving deference to the agency by following the
proposed analysis. If such a regulation were not implemented, the court's "deference
[would be] constrained by [their] obligation to honor the clear meaning of (the] statute, as
revealed by its language, purpose, and history." Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 442 U.S. 392, 411 (1979) (quoting International Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551,
566 n.20 (1979)). Where the agency has not followed the spirit of the law, the court
could rightfully interject its interpretation of the statute.
90. See generally, Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19, 300 (1985) (discuss-
ing the court's and agency's task under the Rehabilitation Act); Janis, A Unified Theory
For Section 504 Employment Discrimination Analysis: Equivalent Cost-Based Standards
for "Otherwise Qualified" and "Reasonable Accommodations", 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
63, 72 (1986) (same); Note, Mending, supra note 11, at 718 (same).
91. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941).
92. See Rhode Island, 718 F.2d at 498.
93. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
94. Courts used a similar approach under some Rehabilitation Act cases. See New
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rights laws is that courts should construe the laws liberally, giving them
broad application to remedy the relevant discrimination effectively. 95
Congress clearly intended the ADA to provide a "consistent" standard
to eliminate discrimination.96 Based upon this intention, the factors con-
tained in the ADA97 and the principle of liberal construction, courts can
validly interpret undue hardship as the effect on profitability and morale.
This analysis establishes a clearer means to determine whether the ADA
requires an accommodation. By using profitability and morale, courts
are not inserting new words into Title I, but rather are interpreting the
meaning of the four factors in order to quantify hardship. This approach
avoids the problem under the Rehabilitation Act of dealing with amor-
phous concepts that do not lend themselves to consistent results.98
Although never mentioned in the legislative history, profitability and
morale are at the essence of the four statutory factors. 99 Quantification
of hardship allows the courts to rely on a general rule rather than make
fact-specific interpretations of undue hardship. Thus, the point at which
hardship becomes undue will be consistent in each case, and businesses
will have a predictable basis to determine whether they must provide an
accommodation, zoo
Merely quantifying hardship to determine the point at which it be-
comes undue is not enough. Courts should further interpret undue hard-
ship as a narrow exemption triggered only when the accommodation
causes "significant difficulty or expense," ' is "unduly costly, extensive,
substantial, disruptive" or "fundamentally alter[s] the nature of the
[business]." 102 In other words, a material negative effect in profitability
or morale must occur before hardship is undue.
Any change in profitability and morale less than a material negative
one will not be sufficient to constitute an undue hardship. While the
driving force behind American business is the desire to make a profit, the
York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979); Cook
v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see generally Note,
Mending supra note 11, at 718-20 (discussing sources of interpretation). Due to the
vagueness of the statute and legislative history, their ability to apply the law liberally
remained limited.
95. See Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Cook, 502 F. Supp. at 501.
96. See supra note 53.
97. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 49-51.
99. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
100. Throughout the legislative process, Representatives of the House reiterated their
concern about the lack of guidance provided by Title I's nebulous language. See e.g., 136
Cong. Rec. H2471 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
101. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 101(10)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 331, U.S.C.S. 1667 (Law. Co-
op. Aug. 1990).
102. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 35; House Report, supra note 2, at 67.
Courts created an equally narrow exemption for the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion defense under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 838
F.2d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 1133 (1989).
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undue hardship exemption promises not profit maximization, but protec-
tion from material threats to business viability. By interpreting undue
hardship narrowly, Courts follow congressional intent to recognize the
"economic realities of our Nation's businesses" 10 3 while affording the dis-
abled the basic right to equal employment opportunities.
1. Profitability
In determining whether a material effect on profitability has occurred,
courts typically consider the cost of an accommodation to the busi-
ness. "0 The ADA clearly calls for basing determinations of undue hard-
ship on objective data regarding the cost of the accommodation for a
particular individual, not on presumptions as to the abilities of a class of
disabled individuals or the hardships they will cause. 105 Closer examina-
tion of the cost of implementing required accommodations reveals that,
in spite of the fears of the business community, 06 most accommodations
can be effected at nominal cost.
The most obvious cost, for example, is that of special equipment or
assistance. 107 The accommodation may also impose costs in the form of
administrative time and effort expended to restructure or modify the
job.0 8 Studies have shown, however, that over half the accommodations
required are simple0 9 and can be provided at no cost, and that thirty
103. 135 Cong. Rec. S10,735 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
"The Committee expects that a court will look at the practical realities of the situation, to
determine how the workforce and resources of a covered entity and the facility interre-
late." See House Report, supra note 2, at 68 (emphasis added).
104. See Janis, supra note 90, at 72-73. "All ... justifications for refusing to hire a
handicapped individual are based on cost; whether it is the cost of making accommoda-
tions.. ., the risk of future costs, or the cost of making individualized determinations of
ability." Id. at 72.
105. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 28; see also House Report, supra note 2, at 74
(employment decisions cannot be based on paternalistic views); id. at 58 (cannot deny
employment because of group-based predictions).
106. Opponents of Title I fear the reasonable accommodation mandate because busi-
nesses cannot pass the cost of the accommodation on to consumers unless their competi-
tion also makes similar expenditures. See Collignon, The Role of Reasonable
Accommodation in Employing Disabled Persons in Private Industry in Disability and the
Labor Market 211 (M. Berkowitz & M. Hill 2d ed. 1986). At first glance, this fear ap-
pears justified. See id. at 207. Most American businesses strive in dynamic and fiercely
competitive environments in which monopoly status is rare and, in any event, short-lived.
See J. Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 209 (3d ed. 1984). However, this fear is
also based on the erroneous assumption that Title I will require large expenditures by
employers seeking to comply with its provision. See Collignon, supra at 207; see also U.S.
Dept. of Labor, 1 A Study of Accommodations Provided to Handicapped Employees by
Federal Contractors 28 (1982) ("The fear that accommodation is expensive is not sup-
ported by the data.").
107. See Janis, supra note 90, at 73.
108. See id.
109. Such simple accommodations could include raising a desk with blocks for a
wheelchair; using alternative testing procedures for visually impaired individuals; re-dele-
gating or exchanging assignments; providing constant shifts or modified work schedules
to adapt to an individual's particular medical or transportation schedule; providing a
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percent of accommodations that do impose costs can be provided for less
than $500.1 In fact, one study found that only eight percent of accom-
modations would involve costs over $2000."' In most cases, therefore,
businesses suffer only a negligible effect on profitability." 2 Thus, only a
material effect on profitability should constitute undue hardship.
Another cost that the courts frequently recognize in section 504 cases
is a decrease in productivity or efficiency." 3 Common sense, however,
suggests that such costs will be nominal: by definition, an employee
given reasonable accommodation is an individual otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job." 4 On the other hand, justifi-
able costs from lost efficiency may arise in situations where assistance
from a co-worker is required: efficiency is decreased when two people
rather than one handle a single task." 5
2. Morale
Similarly, a reasonable accommodation may impose hardship on an
employer by decreasing firm morale. Morale refers to the effect of the
accommodation on the other workers' tasks." 6 A material change in
morale occurs when the employer fundamentally alters a skilled worker's
speaker-phone, headset or receiver stand so that a person with one functional hand can
speak on the phone and write a message; providing braille material and devices; moving a
program or service to an accessible part of the building; or having a secretary or staff
person serve as a reader for a blind employee rather than hiring a part-time reader. See
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 49, at 2.
110. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 106, at 28-31; U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, supra note 49, at 2; E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Equal to the Task:
1981 du Pont Survey of Employment of the Handicapped 17 (1982).
111. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 106, at 28-29.
112. Representative Unsoeld said that Washington State has a similar statute. Yet he
saw no evidence that complying businesses were forced out of business because of the cost
of accommodating or hiring the disabled. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2434 (daily ed. May 17,
1990) (statement of Rep. Unsoeld).
113. See Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983); Dexler v. Tisch,
660 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (D. Conn. 1987); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
114. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 25-26; House Report, supra note 2, at 70. For
instance if speed is necessary for a position, it should be an essential function of that job.
115. Such situations can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. See Senate Report,
supra note 2, at 33.
Employing a disabled individual may also impose future costs on the employer. These
costs may include the risk that an accident will occur, or that an employee's disability is
degenerative and thus his output may deteriorate. See Janis, supra note 90, at 73-74. The
first risk would not be a valid claim because the ADA does not require employers to
provide accommodation where it or the individual poses a significant safety risk to others
or to property. Similarly, the risk that an employee's ability to do the job will deteriorate
is not a valid consideration because an employer cannot refuse to employ a capable indi-
vidual because he may some day require accommodations that will impose undue hard-
ship. The undue hardship inquiry should remain the same regardless of the degenerative
nature of the disability.
116. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also T. Caplow, supra note 79, at
128 (morale refers to satisfaction with the business, not happiness of individual
employees).
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job to such an extent that the employee harbors resentment and resist-
ance toward the new work environment.117 Although a material effect
on morale is intangible and thus difficult to pinpoint, management has an
interest in the firm's viability as well as in its workers and thus has reason
to find this an unfair price.'i1
To establish a material effect on morale, employers must demonstrate
that the accommodation will substantially or fundamentally disrupt or
alter their workforce. Morale is most often affected when the predictabil-
ity of employees' jobs is disrupted to such an extent that their rewards
are less than their efforts, sacrifices and status would have indicated.'1 9
Any major disruption of this sort will likely result in a change in attitude
toward the employer and the business, 120 resulting in damage to the busi-
ness in the form of disrupted cooperation and potential loss of resources
and personnel.
12
Experience under the Rehabilitation Act suggests that serious morale
problems under the ADA will be rare. One survey found that only three
percent of reasonable accommodations provided under the Rehabilita-
tion Act made co-workers' jobs more difficult. 2 2 Under the ADA, such
an effect on morale should be equally rare because Congress has already
classified certain accommodations as reasonable.123 For instance, job re-
structuring, which includes redelegating assignments, exchanging assign-
ments, redesigning procedures 24 and modifying work schedules, 12 will
have ramifications on other employees but generally not of sufficient
magnitude to impose undue hardship. Thus, these examples suggest that
most accommodations typically will not effect morale and that courts
should thus consider them reasonable.
IV. SUGGESTED REGULATION FOR UNDUE HARDSHIP AND
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
Within one year after the ADA's passage, the delegated agencies must
implement regulations that further define obligations under the ADA.
Congress has-delegated the authority to make regulations implementing
117. See R. Flanagen, R. Smith & R. Ehrenberg, supra note 78, at 183. For example, if
a construction worker is especially skilled in one particular aspect of building, that
worker will no longer use that skill after a reasonable accommodation is made, thus mate-
rially altering his job to such an extent that his morale is decreased and the business is
negatively affected. Similarly, the firing or moving of an employee from a particular job
could materially decrease morale. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 32.
118. See R. Flanagen, R. Smith & R. Ehrenberg, supra note 78, at 51; T. Caplow,
supra note 79, at 130-131.
119. See T. Caplow, supra note 79, at 158.
120. See id. at 158-59.
121. See id. at 167-68.
122. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 106, at 33.
123. See supra note 6; Senate Report, supra note 2, at 3 1; House Report, supra note 2, at
62-65.
124. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 31; House Report, supra note 2, at 62.
125. See id.
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Title I to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
("EEOC").'26 Because Title I of the ADA contains reasonable accom-
modation and undue hardship language-language similar to that used
in the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act-the EEOC reg-
ulation should define discriminatory acts more exactly. The courts will
give deference to regulations as long as they comport with the language
and legislative intent of the statute.12 7
The implementing regulations must specify the point at which hard-
ship on a business will overcome the substantial benefits of the ADA, or
where a business' viability is threatened by a material decrease in profit-
ability and morale. Such a regulation might read as follows:
Undue Hardship. An employer will sustain undue hardship if as a re-
sult of providing a reasonable accommodation the employer suffers:
(a) an X percentage decrease in its net margin.128 To determine
the percentage change in net margin, cost of accommodation
should be added to the previous fiscal year's total cost of sales
(expenses) and then divided by the previous fiscal year's revenues.
If this figure is X percentage greater than the previous fiscal year's
true expense/revenues margin, the accommodation has caused
undue hardship. Or,
(b) an X percentage decrease in morale. The percentage change
in morale shall be measured by a change in the work habits of X
percent of employees resulting from a decrease in rewards ex-
pected for expended efforts.
If pursuant to (a) or (b) an employer sustains undue hardship, it will
not have discriminated under Section 102(b)(5) of the ADA.
A regulation that bases the maximum level of hardship employers
must sustain on the percentage decrease in net margins and negative fun-
damental changes in employees' attitudes provides a clear and consistent
standard for the judiciary as well as for employers and disabled employ-
ees. Because maximizing profitability is the purpose and prerogative of
American businesses, it serves as the proper benchmark to determine
whether an accommodation imposes undue hardship. Similarly, funda-
mental changes in employee attitude present an indirect but definite
means of destroying a business' viability through a reduction in the en-
ergy and enthusiasm of the workforce. This threat to the workforce can
hinder the business' ability to retain and recruit the best employees,
which may ultimately injure the firm's competitive edge.
The measurement of profitability and morale provides employees at all
levels an equal opportunity to receive necessary accommodations. Other
126. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 106, 104 Stat. 327, 336, U.S.C.S. 1672 (Law. Co-op.
Aug. 1990).
127. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979).
128. A percentage change in net margin will reflect the absolute change in the margin.
For example, if a business' net margin was ten percent prior to making an accommoda-
tion and eight percent after providing an accommodation, the percentage change is 20
percent, not two percent.
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quantitative means, such as a percentage of an employee's salary,' 29 do
not have that virtue. Congress rejected the plan to limit expenditures to
a percentage of an employee's salary because it creates a floor, not a ceil-
ing, 130 and because it discriminates against the lowest paid employees.' 3 '
Finally, such a solution ignores the fact that many accommodations
serve more than just the employee who initially requires it, making that
employee's salary an improper basis to determine undue hardship. 32 A
regulation based on profitability and morale, on the other hand, does not
focus on the individual's position but instead on the accommodation's
impact on the business. Furthermore, the regulation requires the busi-
nesses that can continue to function competitively to provide
accommodations.
Arguably, the proposed regulation is a major departure from the HEW
regulation implementing the Rehabilitation Act, but it is not the first to
set threshold points at which conduct is no longer discriminatory. An
illustration given under the Department of Transportation's regulation
for section 504, for example, set a percentage of the budget as the satis-
factory amount to expend on making public transportation readily acces-
sible. 133 The proposed regulation also addresses congressional intent to
protect business viability. 3 4 It identifies profitability and morale as
quantifiable terms that best illustrate how the four factors relate to undue
hardship,'35 while setting threshold points at which viability is
threatened.
By setting points at which hardship becomes undue, the regulation will
effectively separate those claims brought because real hardship is im-
posed from those brought as a result of prejudiced attitudes about the
disabled. The latter claims generally assert that accommodations are
costly and that disabled individuals will disrupt the workplace.' 36 The
proposed regulation will thus provide a way to eliminate nearly all disa-
bility discrimination and exclude from employment only those disabled
individuals whose disabilities truly require a significantly difficult or ex-
pensive accommodation.
129. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2471-72 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
130. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2472 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bartlett).
131. See id. at H2473 (statement of Rep. Schroeder).
132. See id. at H2474 (statement of Rep. Payne).
133. See 49 C.F.R. § 27. Subpt. D, App. A (1989).
134. See supra note 103.
135. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The number of employees is only
germane to undue hardship when considered in conjunction with the financial resources
of the company, because together they determine how much the company can afford
before the accommodation negatively changes its profits. The structure of the workforce
is important only to the extent that the accommodation will alter it and thus effect mo-
rale. Moreover, the cost of the accommodation is only important to the extent it de-
creases profitability.
136. Congress recognizes that one of the greatest barriers to employing the disabled is
not the cost but rather society's attitude toward the disabled. See Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 35; House Report, supra note 2, at 71 & 74.
[Vol. 59
UNDUE HARDSHIP
CONCLUSION
Title I of the ADA affords disabled individuals the opportunity to be-
come active contributors to society by protecting their right to equal em-
ployment opportunities. Congress achieved this result by going beyond
the limits of the Rehabilitation Act. First, Title I covers all private em-
ployers. Second, it provides guidelines that impose on employers the
duty of providing reasonable accommodations unless undue hardship is
established.
In order to end discrimination against the disabled, courts must inter-
pret the guidelines as requiring a presumption in favor of providing rea-
sonable accommodations. This obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations is limited only by congressional intent to preserve busi-
ness' economic viability. Although businesses may sustain some degree
of hardship, such hardship will threaten viability only when it becomes
undue-a point that can be represented by a material negative change in
profitability or morale.
Basing undue hardship on a decline in profitability and morale breaks
down into quantifiable terms the size of the business and facility, the
nature of the business and the cost of the accommodation. This ap-
proach allows courts to avoid overly fact-specific analysis. If courts ap-
ply a presumption in favor of providing reasonable accommodations and
if there is a regulation that labels the point at which hardship becomes
undue, then congressional intent to allow the 43 million disabled Ameri-
cans to enter the work force and to preserve the viability of the nation's
businesses can be fulfilled.
Julie Brandfield
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